1 00:00:01,900 --> 00:00:03,420 [ Bird cries ] 2 00:00:03,500 --> 00:00:11,800 Fifty years ago, NASA was on the precipice of mankind's most historic small steps. 3 00:00:11,800 --> 00:00:16,020 EGS Program Chief Engineer verify no constraints to launch. 4 00:00:16,020 --> 00:00:18,900 3, 2, 1, and lift-off! 5 00:00:18,900 --> 00:00:20,660 Welcome to Space. 6 00:00:22,900 --> 00:00:29,419 Today we take you inside the Control Room and onto the ocean during the Apollo 11 mission. 7 00:00:29,419 --> 00:00:33,680 We're taking a look back at the work done here on Earth to ensure our heroic astronauts 8 00:00:33,680 --> 00:00:36,399 succeeded on mankind's most daring adventure. 9 00:00:36,399 --> 00:00:42,250 In a few minutes, we'll hear from Milt Heflin and Melissa Jones on oceanic-recovery activities. 10 00:00:42,250 --> 00:00:45,989 But first up, we have Bob Sieck. 11 00:00:45,989 --> 00:00:50,030 He was one of the engineers on console in the Launch Control Center for Apollo 11 and 12 00:00:50,030 --> 00:00:56,440 went on to serve as the Space Shuttle Launch Director in the '80s and '90s. 13 00:00:56,440 --> 00:00:58,460 I am now in the booth with Bob Sieck. 14 00:00:58,460 --> 00:01:00,359 Bob, thanks for joining me. 15 00:01:00,360 --> 00:01:08,310 Pleasure to be here and to continue the acknowledgement of the Apollo Program and the accomplishments. 16 00:01:08,310 --> 00:01:12,680 Yes, so, obviously, we brought you in for a very special reason -- because you have 17 00:01:12,680 --> 00:01:15,610 a very long history with NASA and the Space Program. 18 00:01:15,610 --> 00:01:20,370 So I wanted to let you just kind of give us a really quick kind of flyby of your career, 19 00:01:20,370 --> 00:01:21,510 if you would. 20 00:01:21,510 --> 00:01:23,430 Well, okay. 21 00:01:23,430 --> 00:01:30,650 So, graduated from college with an Electrical Engineering degree, 1960. 22 00:01:30,650 --> 00:01:32,290 We had just invented transistors. 23 00:01:32,290 --> 00:01:36,380 A chip was still something you carved off of a block of wood. 24 00:01:36,380 --> 00:01:37,500 [ Chuckles ] 25 00:01:37,500 --> 00:01:40,200 So three years' active duty in the military. 26 00:01:40,200 --> 00:01:48,430 In '63, came down here to Florida to make it my home and be part of the great adventure. 27 00:01:48,430 --> 00:01:55,270 After a year as a contractor, I got on with NASA in 1964, Journeyman Engineer in Gemini 28 00:01:55,270 --> 00:02:01,800 spacecraft, responsible for the biomedical instrumentation that the astronauts had. 29 00:02:01,800 --> 00:02:06,480 We didn't know much about the effects of space on the body back then, so they were heavily 30 00:02:06,480 --> 00:02:10,690 instrumented -- best way to put it, just like the spacecraft and rocket -- lots of instruments 31 00:02:10,690 --> 00:02:17,111 on the astronauts to see how the body reacted to all the rigors of spaceflight -- did that 32 00:02:17,111 --> 00:02:18,111 through Gemini. 33 00:02:18,111 --> 00:02:25,220 In Apollo, I was responsible -- I was Testing -- Spacecraft Testing Integration Engineer, 34 00:02:25,220 --> 00:02:29,480 which meant you are like a technical test conductor for the tests on the Lunar Module 35 00:02:29,480 --> 00:02:36,701 and the Command Service Module, and held that responsibility all through Apollo, got in 36 00:02:36,701 --> 00:02:42,460 on the ground floor of the Shuttle Program with, essentially, the same responsibility, 37 00:02:42,460 --> 00:02:49,670 and then a couple years in, got promoted to Launch Director in '83, '84 -- had about a 38 00:02:49,670 --> 00:02:56,450 dozen missions then and was then elevated, if that's the term, to the Director of Shuttle 39 00:02:56,450 --> 00:02:58,890 Operations at the Cape. 40 00:02:58,890 --> 00:03:05,290 Challenger happened -- a lot of realignment and changing the organization, obviously, 41 00:03:05,290 --> 00:03:11,780 and after Challenger, I successfully lobbied to go back to being Launch Director. 42 00:03:11,780 --> 00:03:18,060 I felt that was my strongest suit, so to speak, to help with the return to flight effort and 43 00:03:18,060 --> 00:03:26,200 the continuation of the program and enjoyed that for a number of years -- total of 50-some 44 00:03:26,200 --> 00:03:30,050 missions that I'm thankful there was a landing for all of those. 45 00:03:30,050 --> 00:03:31,050 Yeah. 46 00:03:31,050 --> 00:03:36,960 And then was, again, promoted to the Director of Shuttle Operations to handle the transition, 47 00:03:36,960 --> 00:03:41,880 more the responsibility to the contractor and the new contractor at the time -- retired 48 00:03:41,880 --> 00:03:43,300 in '99. 49 00:03:43,300 --> 00:03:47,480 Still connected with the people in the business through some NASA Advisory Panels. 50 00:03:47,480 --> 00:03:51,640 Yeah, and we always love hearing from you and having you back. 51 00:03:51,640 --> 00:03:57,400 We could fill probably days with all of the stories and kind of the wisdom that you have 52 00:03:57,400 --> 00:04:01,069 to share on space, but we wanted to kind of dwell on the '60s. 53 00:04:01,069 --> 00:04:06,910 So, going back to '61, Alan Shepard is flying on a suborbital flight into space. 54 00:04:06,910 --> 00:04:08,750 Do you remember this moment? 55 00:04:08,750 --> 00:04:17,630 Yes, I do, and the fact that we did it was -- Regardless of what the Russians had already 56 00:04:17,630 --> 00:04:22,229 done, the fact that we did it first step, literally. 57 00:04:22,229 --> 00:04:26,280 A lot of people think of the Lunar Landing, first step on the Moon. 58 00:04:26,280 --> 00:04:31,969 I think of the first step as Alan Shepard going up, and maybe, in hindsight, the first 59 00:04:31,969 --> 00:04:39,599 step was the Russians putting Sputnik up that kind of ignited our resolve to do something 60 00:04:39,599 --> 00:04:48,430 about this in sort of a competitive way at first, and, thankfully, the visionaries in 61 00:04:48,430 --> 00:04:57,569 Washington saw to that, and that ended with the challenge of putting a man on the Moon 62 00:04:57,569 --> 00:05:00,419 and returning them safely -- never want to forget that part -- 63 00:05:00,419 --> 00:05:01,419 Yeah. 64 00:05:01,419 --> 00:05:02,419 [ Chuckles ] 65 00:05:02,419 --> 00:05:07,639 ...by the Kennedy Administration and starting that great adventure. 66 00:05:07,639 --> 00:05:09,039 And what's that like for you personally? 67 00:05:09,039 --> 00:05:13,960 'Cause at this point, I think you said you're finishing up college, Sputnik's flying, we're 68 00:05:13,960 --> 00:05:16,699 getting Alan Shepard off the ground. 69 00:05:16,699 --> 00:05:23,360 Is NASA like this fierce kind of wonderful thing that's unattainable, or is it like, 70 00:05:23,360 --> 00:05:25,249 "Let's be America, let's go do this"? 71 00:05:25,249 --> 00:05:28,319 I think it's the latter. 72 00:05:28,319 --> 00:05:37,930 NASA was obviously given the baton to do this, the responsibility, and the sense was that 73 00:05:37,930 --> 00:05:45,379 there was commitment behind that task or that resolve or our resolution -- whatever you 74 00:05:45,379 --> 00:05:49,759 want to call it -- in the political environment, which was important. 75 00:05:49,759 --> 00:05:55,809 So I said, "Well, I want to be at the front end of this adventure.” 76 00:05:55,809 --> 00:05:57,059 Yeah. 77 00:05:57,059 --> 00:06:03,259 Obviously, contractors were hiring, also, but it was obvious to me it's a government 78 00:06:03,259 --> 00:06:10,419 responsibility, so I'm gonna go with the government team and see what I can do to be part of it. 79 00:06:10,419 --> 00:06:14,990 And so as we kind of fast-forward a few years, how did you end up with NASA? 80 00:06:14,990 --> 00:06:19,270 Was this just like another job you were applying for or was this, somehow, a special kind of 81 00:06:19,270 --> 00:06:20,270 opportunity? 82 00:06:20,270 --> 00:06:22,930 Oh, I looked at it as an opportunity for sure. 83 00:06:22,930 --> 00:06:34,819 I took it to heart that this was now a resolve that our nation had put forward and decided 84 00:06:34,819 --> 00:06:36,550 to accept it. 85 00:06:36,550 --> 00:06:40,889 So I didn't look at it as just a job. 86 00:06:40,889 --> 00:06:43,110 It was kind of like, I'm on a mission. 87 00:06:43,110 --> 00:06:47,960 Our government's on a mission, our country's on a mission, so I'm gonna be part of the 88 00:06:47,960 --> 00:06:57,879 team that accepts the challenge and the responsibility of doing the things that need to be done, 89 00:06:57,879 --> 00:07:00,690 as Kennedy said, "not because they're easy, but because they're hard.” 90 00:07:00,690 --> 00:07:01,690 Yeah. 91 00:07:01,690 --> 00:07:06,270 Do you think that everyone kind of came in with that team mentality? 92 00:07:06,270 --> 00:07:10,629 Is it something where you feel part of something bigger than yourself? 93 00:07:10,629 --> 00:07:15,639 I would say yes. 94 00:07:15,639 --> 00:07:19,939 Most of us that worked in the early years of the Space Program had spent time in the 95 00:07:19,939 --> 00:07:21,050 military. 96 00:07:21,050 --> 00:07:22,169 Okay. 97 00:07:22,169 --> 00:07:23,170 Mandatory draft back then, so – 98 00:07:23,170 --> 00:07:27,039 – So not even just the astronauts, but the engineers on the floor? 99 00:07:27,039 --> 00:07:28,039 Right. 100 00:07:28,039 --> 00:07:29,039 Oh, yeah. 101 00:07:29,039 --> 00:07:30,039 Yeah. 102 00:07:30,039 --> 00:07:35,779 I would sit at the console next to people that sat in foxholes in Korea or flew B-17s 103 00:07:35,779 --> 00:07:43,930 in World War II, and this is a -- We felt -- and I think we were looked at -- as we're 104 00:07:43,930 --> 00:07:48,090 a national resource on a government mission here. 105 00:07:48,090 --> 00:07:51,110 We're not wearing uniforms anymore like most of us did. 106 00:07:51,110 --> 00:07:52,110 Yeah. 107 00:07:52,110 --> 00:07:53,110 Wow. 108 00:07:53,110 --> 00:07:58,699 But we understand responsibility and accountability, and we've been charged that this is our mission, 109 00:07:58,699 --> 00:08:05,419 and so we took it seriously and, of course, proceeded accordingly. 110 00:08:05,419 --> 00:08:08,840 But we knew there was a lot of attention to what we were doing. 111 00:08:08,840 --> 00:08:16,139 It would be a very visible thing, but most of us didn't look at that being the big deal, 112 00:08:16,139 --> 00:08:17,689 so to speak. 113 00:08:17,689 --> 00:08:23,539 What was the big deal was -- we're responsible for accomplishing this as an individual and 114 00:08:23,539 --> 00:08:28,659 as a member of a team, and we're gonna get it done. 115 00:08:28,659 --> 00:08:32,669 Do you feel like there's an emotional element to it? 116 00:08:32,669 --> 00:08:37,909 And kind of the thought behind that question is, thinking about if -- I think my tendency 117 00:08:37,909 --> 00:08:43,500 is to think of the military as being very, like, objective and focused, and we execute. 118 00:08:43,500 --> 00:08:44,959 That's what we do. 119 00:08:44,959 --> 00:08:47,800 Do you feel like that's really similar to how NASA was operating or was there a more 120 00:08:47,800 --> 00:08:52,850 emotional component to it that kind of was like this feeling and that commitment and 121 00:08:52,850 --> 00:08:54,399 way beyond just tasks? 122 00:08:54,399 --> 00:08:57,570 Well, I think it was a combination of both. 123 00:08:57,570 --> 00:09:05,440 Obviously the discipline responsibility, accountability thing factored into it, but, also, I remembered 124 00:09:05,440 --> 00:09:11,850 getting the briefings from the NASA managers when a journeyman first came on board was, 125 00:09:11,850 --> 00:09:17,920 "Okay, now you're responsible for this task and maybe this set of hardware has these boundary 126 00:09:17,920 --> 00:09:22,170 conditions and whatever, and this is your system, and you're gonna interact with that 127 00:09:22,170 --> 00:09:23,269 system" -- technical stuff. 128 00:09:23,269 --> 00:09:24,269 Sure. 129 00:09:24,269 --> 00:09:30,990 But the other part of it was -- the message that came loud and clear was, now, in addition 130 00:09:30,990 --> 00:09:37,220 to that responsibility, this is all about the crew and the mission -- number-one priority 131 00:09:37,220 --> 00:09:38,399 is the crew and the mission. 132 00:09:38,399 --> 00:09:41,459 We talk about getting off the ground with the rocket. 133 00:09:41,459 --> 00:09:48,470 Yeah, you can cheer that, but it's all about getting these astronauts through their missions, 134 00:09:48,470 --> 00:09:54,890 successfully accomplish landing them, and continuing on with the program. 135 00:09:54,890 --> 00:09:59,000 So the emphasis was always on you're responsible for their safety. 136 00:09:59,000 --> 00:10:04,220 This is your system, but if you get in a fuzzy area about responsibility, never forget the 137 00:10:04,220 --> 00:10:08,010 number-one priority is the crew and their mission. 138 00:10:08,010 --> 00:10:13,329 How does that impact you and the people around you when we lose the crew Apollo 1, then? 139 00:10:13,329 --> 00:10:15,399 'Cause, obviously, like, that's got to be hard. 140 00:10:15,399 --> 00:10:16,399 It is hard. 141 00:10:16,399 --> 00:10:17,410 It is tough. 142 00:10:17,410 --> 00:10:29,529 The initial feeling is, we failed, and the challenge of that is getting over the -- First, 143 00:10:29,529 --> 00:10:33,089 there's the shock and the grief and the guilt. 144 00:10:33,089 --> 00:10:34,819 You know, what went wrong? 145 00:10:34,819 --> 00:10:35,819 What did we do wrong? 146 00:10:35,819 --> 00:10:40,100 What did I do wrong as a member of the team, if anything? 147 00:10:40,100 --> 00:10:47,610 And then you get into that aspect of, okay, technically what happened here? 148 00:10:47,610 --> 00:10:48,620 What did we do? 149 00:10:48,620 --> 00:10:54,569 And then that gets broader into, well, are there cultural issues here? 150 00:10:54,569 --> 00:10:55,569 What went wrong there? 151 00:10:55,569 --> 00:10:58,319 Then you get on with fixing everything. 152 00:10:58,319 --> 00:11:02,819 And you can take this to a level lower. 153 00:11:02,819 --> 00:11:05,649 When you made mistakes as a journeyman engineer -- and we did. 154 00:11:05,649 --> 00:11:06,649 You're human. 155 00:11:06,649 --> 00:11:07,649 Yeah, that makes sense. 156 00:11:07,649 --> 00:11:11,639 We're doing stuff for the first time, and we're developing the hardware for the first 157 00:11:11,639 --> 00:11:17,589 time, the procedures to test it, and the approach of management was, well, okay, Bobby -- in 158 00:11:17,589 --> 00:11:20,230 this case -- assume, okay, you made a mistake. 159 00:11:20,230 --> 00:11:22,029 Scoot up and tell it like it is. 160 00:11:22,029 --> 00:11:26,589 Now, you won't make that mistake anymore as a journeyman engineer, but the fellow coming 161 00:11:26,589 --> 00:11:32,480 in tomorrow or one that's on second shift, or whatever, coming in, they're gonna potentially 162 00:11:32,480 --> 00:11:38,290 do the same thing, 'cause you're a responsible person, and this was not an irresponsible 163 00:11:38,290 --> 00:11:39,900 act on your part. 164 00:11:39,900 --> 00:11:45,949 So what did we -- management speaking from their viewpoint, what did we do to not set 165 00:11:45,949 --> 00:11:49,040 you up to succeed, if that makes a difference? 166 00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:51,199 Is it the training we gave you? 167 00:11:51,199 --> 00:11:52,790 Is it the tools? 168 00:11:52,790 --> 00:11:54,449 Is it the procedures? 169 00:11:54,449 --> 00:12:00,449 Because that's management's responsibility to set you people doing this work up to be 170 00:12:00,449 --> 00:12:06,570 successful and to develop a high-quality product -- whatever it is. 171 00:12:06,570 --> 00:12:08,160 So let's talk about that. 172 00:12:08,160 --> 00:12:11,860 Understand the root cause and get on with what we're chartered to do. 173 00:12:11,860 --> 00:12:14,029 It was a great environment to work in, really. 174 00:12:14,029 --> 00:12:21,639 Was there ever a sense that you felt like it was too much -- like the pace was too much, 175 00:12:21,639 --> 00:12:25,149 the risk was too much, like it just wasn't gonna happen? 176 00:12:25,149 --> 00:12:29,410 The short answer is no. 177 00:12:29,410 --> 00:12:37,180 We were confident that we were gonna make progress, and we saw that after each mission 178 00:12:37,180 --> 00:12:38,569 when things went well. 179 00:12:38,569 --> 00:12:44,360 There were always things in the early missions that didn't go well, but there was enough 180 00:12:44,360 --> 00:12:47,820 progress that, no, we're continuing on. 181 00:12:47,820 --> 00:12:53,879 We're gonna get this done, and the work was -- It was an incredible lot of fun. 182 00:12:53,879 --> 00:12:54,879 [ Laughs ] 183 00:12:54,879 --> 00:13:01,430 In fact, you'll hear from a number of the workers it never felt like they really worked 184 00:13:01,430 --> 00:13:03,490 at the Space Center. 185 00:13:03,490 --> 00:13:05,360 It was, "Oh, boy. 186 00:13:05,360 --> 00:13:08,980 I got second shift tomorrow, and we're running this test and whatever. 187 00:13:08,980 --> 00:13:14,879 So I'm gonna work overtime today to brush up on the procedures so I know that when I 188 00:13:14,879 --> 00:13:20,640 come in here tomorrow, put on my headset, and hook things up, that I'm ready to hit 189 00:13:20,640 --> 00:13:26,070 the ground running," and, of course, that drug into long days, long nights, long weeks, 190 00:13:26,070 --> 00:13:30,980 and long months, and I always characterized the whole effort of getting to the Moon, in 191 00:13:30,980 --> 00:13:33,760 my case, as a seven-year marathon. 192 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:34,760 Yeah. 193 00:13:34,760 --> 00:13:36,199 Man, that's a good way to put it. 194 00:13:36,199 --> 00:13:42,079 So, Apollo 8, are you in the Control Room for flying the first humans on Saturn V? 195 00:13:42,079 --> 00:13:43,480 Yes, yes. 196 00:13:43,480 --> 00:13:53,089 That was my first manned Apollo mission, and I was somewhat surprised that it was only 197 00:13:53,089 --> 00:13:59,459 three months after Apollo 7 when we flew the astronauts for the first time in an Apollo 198 00:13:59,459 --> 00:14:06,149 capsule on a smaller Saturn rocket and a previous Saturn V launch with an unmanned rocket, which 199 00:14:06,149 --> 00:14:10,720 had been sometime months before that was not all that successful. 200 00:14:10,720 --> 00:14:11,720 Okay. 201 00:14:11,720 --> 00:14:20,550 But then there was enough confidence in where we were in our development and acceptance 202 00:14:20,550 --> 00:14:27,829 of this new system and confidence in it that we can go ahead and commit to put three astronauts 203 00:14:27,829 --> 00:14:33,120 on top of it and go around the Moon after what had happened only just a few years before 204 00:14:33,120 --> 00:14:38,899 with Apollo 1, and since then, other than a couple of those unmanned Saturn V launches, 205 00:14:38,899 --> 00:14:45,499 and another one on the Saturn I, we committed to put our three astronauts in a spacecraft 206 00:14:45,499 --> 00:14:47,779 and send them to the Moon. 207 00:14:47,779 --> 00:14:48,779 Yeah. 208 00:14:48,779 --> 00:14:53,579 So we see Apollo 8, 9, and 10 go, for all intents and purposes, pretty well. 209 00:14:53,579 --> 00:14:55,189 We're getting ready for Apollo 11. 210 00:14:55,189 --> 00:14:56,189 Is this different? 211 00:14:56,189 --> 00:15:00,129 Does it feel different from a processing perspective? 212 00:15:00,129 --> 00:15:02,620 I think it did not. 213 00:15:02,620 --> 00:15:09,279 The process of getting it ready was the same as the previous ones, and it was well -- and 214 00:15:09,279 --> 00:15:12,279 we looked at it as where we were in the system. 215 00:15:12,279 --> 00:15:15,730 Okay, we accomplished what we had to on this one, Apollo 8. 216 00:15:15,730 --> 00:15:17,459 Apollo 9 got this done. 217 00:15:17,459 --> 00:15:18,579 It was in Earth orbit. 218 00:15:18,579 --> 00:15:20,129 Okay, Apollo 10 got this done. 219 00:15:20,129 --> 00:15:21,519 Now it's in lunar orbit. 220 00:15:21,519 --> 00:15:28,310 So next step is, yeah, let that Lunar Module go all the way down there and let the guys 221 00:15:28,310 --> 00:15:30,730 accomplish the objective. 222 00:15:30,730 --> 00:15:36,420 And my take on schedule pressure and that sort of thing was -- it was kind of coincidental 223 00:15:36,420 --> 00:15:39,710 that it happened when it did. 224 00:15:39,710 --> 00:15:40,870 [ Chuckles ] Coincidental? 225 00:15:40,870 --> 00:15:41,870 Really. 226 00:15:41,870 --> 00:15:42,870 Yeah. 227 00:15:42,870 --> 00:15:43,870 Because, well, it just did. 228 00:15:43,870 --> 00:15:48,120 It ended up playing out that way, but we followed the progression of events. 229 00:15:48,120 --> 00:15:53,100 We made some modifications along the way as we found problems and fixed them and developed 230 00:15:53,100 --> 00:15:59,660 more confidence in the system, and it ended up -- but the approach, again, always from 231 00:15:59,660 --> 00:16:04,709 our management was, "Hey, you just do the job right, accomplish all the requirements 232 00:16:04,709 --> 00:16:08,709 and objectives, and then you look up at the clock or the calendar, in this case, and say, 233 00:16:08,709 --> 00:16:10,920 'Okay, now we're ready for the next step.'" 234 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:17,620 In that case, the next step was Apollo 11, and that first step. 235 00:16:17,620 --> 00:16:22,490 So, for the launch of Apollo 11, where are you and kind of what are you doing during 236 00:16:22,490 --> 00:16:23,519 this time? 237 00:16:23,519 --> 00:16:24,519 Okay. 238 00:16:24,519 --> 00:16:26,839 So my primary assignment is Apollo 12. 239 00:16:26,839 --> 00:16:33,139 I worked Apollo 10, and then we jumped -- And we always had at least two missions in flow 240 00:16:33,139 --> 00:16:34,139 down here. 241 00:16:34,139 --> 00:16:36,410 We had the hardware for that, which was a lot of hardware. 242 00:16:36,410 --> 00:16:37,410 Yeah. 243 00:16:37,410 --> 00:16:39,790 You know, three, actually four stages of the rocket. 244 00:16:39,790 --> 00:16:40,790 Yeah. 245 00:16:40,790 --> 00:16:44,550 Two payloads -- the spacecraft, the Lunar Module, Command Service Module, and all the 246 00:16:44,550 --> 00:16:49,269 stuff that hooked them together -- most important payload, of course, being the flight crew. 247 00:16:49,269 --> 00:16:50,269 Sure. 248 00:16:50,269 --> 00:16:56,470 So we kind of cycled back and forth, and so I was on the even-numbered missions in terms 249 00:16:56,470 --> 00:17:04,400 of the campaign of the launch count itself when our hardware was in Operations and Checkout 250 00:17:04,400 --> 00:17:05,400 Building. 251 00:17:05,400 --> 00:17:10,350 We moved back and forth to different spacecraft doing particular tests, depending on our expertise. 252 00:17:10,350 --> 00:17:19,550 But when it came to Apollo 11, the primary launch team guy for my position was in the 253 00:17:19,550 --> 00:17:22,440 Control Center in the Operations and Checkout Building. 254 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:27,440 If we were not part of the primary launch time process, if we needed to come in as a 255 00:17:27,440 --> 00:17:31,190 backup or scrub the next day-type thing, you had an assignment. 256 00:17:31,190 --> 00:17:32,510 But I was not in the Control Room. 257 00:17:32,510 --> 00:17:36,880 In fact, all of us that were not part of that were advised to stay home... 258 00:17:36,880 --> 00:17:37,880 Huh. 259 00:17:37,880 --> 00:17:43,520 ...and take some compensatory time, annual leave, or whatever, and be a spectator, which, 260 00:17:43,520 --> 00:17:50,520 and, therefore, to not add to the huge traffic jam which occurred every Apollo mission by 261 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:54,460 the way, but it was more so because this one was Apollo 11. 262 00:17:54,460 --> 00:17:57,640 But that was kind of lost on us. 263 00:17:57,640 --> 00:18:02,580 Apollo 10, which we just finished, was just as important, and Apollo 12 will be just as 264 00:18:02,580 --> 00:18:03,580 important. 265 00:18:03,580 --> 00:18:08,640 This is the next one in the queue, and they're just gonna do more on their mission than we 266 00:18:08,640 --> 00:18:11,400 did the previous, which had been the legacy up to now. 267 00:18:11,400 --> 00:18:12,640 So I got to be a spectator. 268 00:18:12,640 --> 00:18:20,160 I got to watch with my wife and toddler from Titusville, where I lived, which was the first 269 00:18:20,160 --> 00:18:21,910 one I was able to watch, by the way. 270 00:18:21,910 --> 00:18:27,030 All the rest of them, I had been in the Control Room and watching with my little 8-inch black-and-white 271 00:18:27,030 --> 00:18:28,030 television set. 272 00:18:28,030 --> 00:18:33,470 I couldn't wait to get home to watch the replays on my 18-inch black-and-white TV set. 273 00:18:33,470 --> 00:18:37,690 [ Laughs ] So was that really the life of that Control Room Engineer? 274 00:18:37,690 --> 00:18:40,740 Your job is to watch your eight-inch screen? 275 00:18:40,740 --> 00:18:49,990 That's it, and handle the discrepancies and anomalies that come up as they often did back 276 00:18:49,990 --> 00:18:55,130 then -- take over the process of sorting out whether this isn't going well. 277 00:18:55,130 --> 00:18:56,440 Is it the procedures? 278 00:18:56,440 --> 00:18:58,000 Is it the hardware? 279 00:18:58,000 --> 00:19:02,500 It was seldom the software because we didn't have any software back then, or the requirements 280 00:19:02,500 --> 00:19:10,020 were asking this hardware to do too much, 'cause it really can't accomplish those specifications 281 00:19:10,020 --> 00:19:11,790 in that environment. 282 00:19:11,790 --> 00:19:18,800 But that was my primary job as a Test Engineer for the Command Service Module Spacecraft. 283 00:19:18,800 --> 00:19:22,330 And did you have any sort of function once lift-off happened? 284 00:19:22,330 --> 00:19:26,760 Were you guys involved with the actual landing operations or the Moon walks? 285 00:19:26,760 --> 00:19:34,830 No, once it was "Tower clear," literally, our next responsibility came in as participants 286 00:19:34,830 --> 00:19:42,900 in the recovery, but we had a Control Room active, on call in the event of an anomaly 287 00:19:42,900 --> 00:19:50,140 or somebody needed information from the experience of the hardware and the testing at the Cape. 288 00:19:50,140 --> 00:19:52,870 We were there to respond to that, yes. 289 00:19:52,870 --> 00:19:56,000 And, of course, that happened on Apollo 13. 290 00:19:56,000 --> 00:19:57,300 Sure. 291 00:19:57,300 --> 00:20:03,390 So I'm assuming that you would have just been one of the 600 million people worldwide getting 292 00:20:03,390 --> 00:20:04,640 to watch on television. 293 00:20:04,640 --> 00:20:05,640 Exactly. 294 00:20:05,640 --> 00:20:06,640 Yes. 295 00:20:06,640 --> 00:20:07,640 Okay. 296 00:20:07,640 --> 00:20:15,180 I still remember on the grainy black-and-white TV set the landing process in the afternoon, 297 00:20:15,180 --> 00:20:20,990 and, of course, that night I made it mandatory -- the kids weren't that old yet, but required 298 00:20:20,990 --> 00:20:26,210 that they be in the living room with mom and I watching the first step. 299 00:20:26,210 --> 00:20:28,650 That seems like a good way to spend an evening. 300 00:20:28,650 --> 00:20:33,110 Well, it was for me. 301 00:20:33,110 --> 00:20:39,770 There's kind of an anxiety because we know -- As engineers, you think about all the things 302 00:20:39,770 --> 00:20:40,800 that could go wrong. 303 00:20:40,800 --> 00:20:45,040 So every time something went right, it was kind of one of these, "Eh, yeah. 304 00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:46,040 Okay. 305 00:20:46,040 --> 00:20:47,040 Okay, yeah. 306 00:20:47,040 --> 00:20:48,040 That worked. 307 00:20:48,040 --> 00:20:50,360 Yeah, there's another good, you know, type of thing.” 308 00:20:50,360 --> 00:20:58,460 So we're probably more into it than the average spectator, if that makes sense. 309 00:20:58,460 --> 00:21:05,530 But the way I look at it, and the way everybody else did, too -- hey, we're all part of a 310 00:21:05,530 --> 00:21:07,780 team here to accomplish this. 311 00:21:07,780 --> 00:21:12,450 You don't have to be doing the highly visible thing on launch day to be an important member 312 00:21:12,450 --> 00:21:15,180 of the team. 313 00:21:15,180 --> 00:21:16,230 You think about it. 314 00:21:16,230 --> 00:21:20,160 Somebody that does a final-recovery parachute rigging. 315 00:21:20,160 --> 00:21:25,131 That happened in the "O" and "C" Building weeks, month before launch, and then they 316 00:21:25,131 --> 00:21:32,210 stamp a procedure that says, "Oh, I did this correctly, and I'm certifying it was done 317 00:21:32,210 --> 00:21:33,210 right.” 318 00:21:33,210 --> 00:21:37,450 Well, they just gave a "Go" for launch just as important as the one that somebody does 319 00:21:37,450 --> 00:21:42,120 in the Control Room with a headset on at T-minus whatever minutes and all the attention and 320 00:21:42,120 --> 00:21:44,130 visibility that that got, so... 321 00:21:44,130 --> 00:21:49,360 And the important thing is, that person -- using that example, that parachute rigging -- knew 322 00:21:49,360 --> 00:21:57,000 that what they were doing was important and that it had to work, and that's what made 323 00:21:57,000 --> 00:22:04,850 every member of the team feel like I'm part of a something that's much bigger than me 324 00:22:04,850 --> 00:22:11,480 because people are giving those go's for launch all around the center, in some places elsewhere 325 00:22:11,480 --> 00:22:14,830 around the program just like I am right now. 326 00:22:14,830 --> 00:22:23,090 So they should naturally celebrate and take pride in that first step, so to speak. 327 00:22:23,090 --> 00:22:26,950 Did you find a similar mentality with your coworkers at the time -- just kind of that, 328 00:22:26,950 --> 00:22:30,890 like, at least a moment to kind of just, "We did it. 329 00:22:30,890 --> 00:22:32,350 We accomplished the task.” 330 00:22:32,350 --> 00:22:33,910 Oh, yeah. 331 00:22:33,910 --> 00:22:34,910 Absolutely. 332 00:22:34,910 --> 00:22:39,880 And, of course, you know, we're considered to be, well, you're the launch team. 333 00:22:39,880 --> 00:22:45,450 You get it off the ground, and then after that, okay, your responsibility is over, and 334 00:22:45,450 --> 00:22:49,050 that sort of thing, but the way we look at it is the way I explained earlier with the 335 00:22:49,050 --> 00:22:50,050 Chief Engineer. 336 00:22:50,050 --> 00:22:57,150 He said, "No, it's not done until the crew gets out, gets back on Earth, and then you 337 00:22:57,150 --> 00:22:58,650 can really celebrate.” 338 00:22:58,650 --> 00:22:59,650 Sure. 339 00:22:59,650 --> 00:23:06,370 So we're now five decades removed from that historic moment -- those historic moments. 340 00:23:06,370 --> 00:23:08,380 As you reflect back, what's your takeaway? 341 00:23:08,380 --> 00:23:10,940 Like, how do you process that today? 342 00:23:10,940 --> 00:23:20,560 Well, it's -- I think it's a reason to be kind of celebratory over the accomplishment, 343 00:23:20,560 --> 00:23:27,580 and, from a personal standpoint, we felt, okay, we're on a mission with the work we 344 00:23:27,580 --> 00:23:28,580 do. 345 00:23:28,580 --> 00:23:35,070 Every day or night we go to work, again, I'm looked upon by the public and the Administration 346 00:23:35,070 --> 00:23:42,940 at that time as I'm on a mission that the country has decided to embark upon. 347 00:23:42,940 --> 00:23:51,710 So what I do is important, and the fact that Apollo 11 happened to be the one where the 348 00:23:51,710 --> 00:23:52,840 mission planner said, "Okay. 349 00:23:52,840 --> 00:23:53,840 Now it's the one. 350 00:23:53,840 --> 00:24:01,640 We're ready to actually go out on the Moon" was not from the standpoint of looking at 351 00:24:01,640 --> 00:24:02,920 it as a big deal. 352 00:24:02,920 --> 00:24:04,410 It was not a big deal. 353 00:24:04,410 --> 00:24:08,550 You know, it was important now in hindsight, 50 years later. 354 00:24:08,550 --> 00:24:14,470 Well, okay, it was a big deal, but we never got -- and I feel I'm speaking for the others 355 00:24:14,470 --> 00:24:20,970 -- got caught up in, at the time, in that euphoria, that, oh, boy, this one's Apollo 356 00:24:22,970 --> 00:24:21,970 11. 357 00:24:22,970 --> 00:24:28,130 You know, well, I know it's Apollo 11, but Apollo 12 -- You know, you're only as good 358 00:24:28,130 --> 00:24:30,010 as your next mission. 359 00:24:30,010 --> 00:24:31,030 Sure. 360 00:24:31,030 --> 00:24:32,940 So my focus is here. 361 00:24:32,940 --> 00:24:35,780 Yeah, that's good and that's important and we got it done. 362 00:24:35,780 --> 00:24:36,780 Yay. 363 00:24:36,780 --> 00:24:38,910 Now, don't lose sight of the ball. 364 00:24:38,910 --> 00:24:39,910 Yeah. 365 00:24:39,910 --> 00:24:45,480 Any words of wisdom for those that are working on the next giant leap for mankind? 366 00:24:45,480 --> 00:24:49,670 Well, never lose sight of the number-one priority. 367 00:24:49,670 --> 00:24:57,350 That's first and foremost, which is the crew and their mission and accomplishing that safely, 368 00:24:57,350 --> 00:25:01,570 and then you can enjoy the mission success. 369 00:25:01,570 --> 00:25:04,450 Be patient. 370 00:25:04,450 --> 00:25:13,051 Never get caught up in the rush to meet a milestone or worry about the cost, and that 371 00:25:13,051 --> 00:25:16,570 was another one of the things that made Apollo successful. 372 00:25:16,570 --> 00:25:20,070 As journeyman engineers, we said, now, you don't worry about schedules. 373 00:25:20,070 --> 00:25:24,950 You need a realistic schedule, and if this is not realistic, you tell us and don't worry 374 00:25:24,950 --> 00:25:27,990 about what it costs because we're going to the Moon. 375 00:25:27,990 --> 00:25:29,890 This is a national resolve. 376 00:25:29,890 --> 00:25:35,650 So don't make a decision based on worrying about what this is gonna cost. 377 00:25:35,650 --> 00:25:41,760 If this is the right way to go, this is the way you do it. 378 00:25:41,760 --> 00:25:45,920 And you have to approach that the same way if you're working. 379 00:25:45,920 --> 00:25:53,410 Don't compromise what will work and is safe just because you're worried about what it 380 00:25:53,410 --> 00:26:05,290 will cost in terms of schedule or the bucks, and it's a -- And enjoy what you're doing. 381 00:26:05,290 --> 00:26:06,530 Be a member of the team. 382 00:26:06,530 --> 00:26:10,760 I think that's more difficult nowadays than it was then. 383 00:26:10,760 --> 00:26:16,200 We didn't have the technology where you could communicate by e-mails and cellphones. 384 00:26:16,200 --> 00:26:23,290 If you wanted to talk to somebody, you usually got up and went over and talked to that person 385 00:26:23,290 --> 00:26:28,450 because there weren't that many involved in the process down here, and we didn't have 386 00:26:28,450 --> 00:26:36,610 the communications capabilities we have today, and communication is important in a team effort, 387 00:26:36,610 --> 00:26:42,550 and then you build more cohesiveness if you get together, sit down across the table, or 388 00:26:42,550 --> 00:26:43,950 in big meetings, and we had a lot of meetings. 389 00:26:43,950 --> 00:26:45,030 We had a lot of meetings. 390 00:26:45,030 --> 00:26:46,929 'Cause we didn't have the other way to communicate. 391 00:26:46,929 --> 00:26:47,929 [ Laughs ] 392 00:26:47,929 --> 00:26:53,990 So everybody had a feel for everyone else who was a participant and their responsibilities, 393 00:26:53,990 --> 00:26:58,240 and you wanted them to be successful just like you wanted to be successful. 394 00:26:58,240 --> 00:27:07,730 Because if they weren't set up to succeed, then nobody succeeds, if that makes sense. 395 00:27:07,730 --> 00:27:09,910 So be a team player for sure. 396 00:27:09,910 --> 00:27:17,110 Do your homework and never lose sight of the primary objective. 397 00:27:17,110 --> 00:27:24,850 Apollo was -- It was hard because even though we had a lot of people involved, technology 398 00:27:24,850 --> 00:27:28,250 didn't streamline things like it does today. 399 00:27:28,250 --> 00:27:31,530 It wasn't there. 400 00:27:31,530 --> 00:27:35,610 So there was a lot of human face-to-face interface. 401 00:27:35,610 --> 00:27:37,230 You spent long hours, long weeks. 402 00:27:37,230 --> 00:27:38,310 It was hard on families. 403 00:27:38,310 --> 00:27:39,310 Yeah. 404 00:27:39,310 --> 00:27:41,010 You got to make that point. 405 00:27:41,010 --> 00:27:43,720 The term I use -- "Only the strong survive.” 406 00:27:43,720 --> 00:27:47,380 And credit those families, particularly the spouses of the workers, and most of us were 407 00:27:47,380 --> 00:27:54,330 guys back then, that did keep the family unit together. 408 00:27:54,330 --> 00:28:01,830 And I think another item to consider is, if we're comparing back to the '60s, we are a 409 00:28:01,830 --> 00:28:06,360 more risk-adverse society today than we were back then. 410 00:28:06,360 --> 00:28:09,550 Now, that could be the view of a guy getting old and cynical... 411 00:28:09,550 --> 00:28:10,610 [ Laughs ] 412 00:28:10,610 --> 00:28:19,520 ...but we are, and there's a difference between measuring and assessing a risk and gambling. 413 00:28:19,520 --> 00:28:20,900 Yeah. 414 00:28:20,900 --> 00:28:28,150 And so you don't want to get in the gamble part of it, particularly when human lives 415 00:28:28,150 --> 00:28:31,610 are involved. 416 00:28:31,610 --> 00:28:33,300 You just -- You don't. 417 00:28:33,300 --> 00:28:38,690 But, on the other hand, don't be afraid to accept the risk after you've looked at every 418 00:28:38,690 --> 00:28:45,851 aspect of it technically, and the other side effects of it and decide that -- and have 419 00:28:45,851 --> 00:28:50,690 others look at it to accept the risk. 420 00:28:50,690 --> 00:28:56,850 Again, if the goal is worth the risk, stop worrying about it and go do it. 421 00:28:56,850 --> 00:28:57,850 Cool. 422 00:28:57,850 --> 00:29:00,200 Bob, it's a pleasure to have you. 423 00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:01,200 Thanks for stopping by. 424 00:29:01,200 --> 00:29:02,200 All right. 425 00:29:02,200 --> 00:29:03,200 Well, I enjoyed it. 426 00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:04,200 Yeah. 427 00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:07,990 I look forward to the next piece of the great adventure, which has already started because 428 00:29:07,990 --> 00:29:11,130 we've been given a goal, right? 429 00:29:11,130 --> 00:29:12,320 Absolutely. 430 00:29:12,320 --> 00:29:16,890 We tracked down Milt Heflin, one of the guys who worked Recovery Operations in the Pacific 431 00:29:16,890 --> 00:29:20,970 Ocean when Apollo 11 returned from the Moon. 432 00:29:20,970 --> 00:29:24,870 He was actually pretty easy to find as he is currently lending his expertise to the 433 00:29:24,870 --> 00:29:28,120 team developing Orion Recovery procedures. 434 00:29:28,120 --> 00:29:32,350 And he brought along one of his colleagues -- actually, the NASA Landing and Recovery 435 00:29:32,350 --> 00:29:36,500 Director for Exploration Ground Systems, Melissa Jones. 436 00:29:36,500 --> 00:29:38,960 All right. 437 00:29:38,960 --> 00:29:43,070 I'm in the booth now with Milt Heflin and Melissa Jones. 438 00:29:43,070 --> 00:29:45,250 Thank you both for joining me today. 439 00:29:45,250 --> 00:29:46,250 Thanks for having us. 440 00:29:46,250 --> 00:29:47,250 You bet. 441 00:29:47,250 --> 00:29:49,740 So, I want to kind of go back a little bit. 442 00:29:49,740 --> 00:29:54,850 So, Milt, you actually worked Recovery for the Apollo Program back in the '60s. 443 00:29:54,850 --> 00:29:55,850 Correct? 444 00:29:55,850 --> 00:29:56,850 I did. 445 00:29:56,850 --> 00:30:01,620 I was on the primary recovery ship for the splashdowns of eight Apollo missions. 446 00:30:01,620 --> 00:30:02,620 Man. 447 00:30:02,620 --> 00:30:04,870 So, let's go back a little bit further than that. 448 00:30:04,870 --> 00:30:09,210 What's it like kind of growing up -- 'Cause when you were growing up, there were no astronauts. 449 00:30:09,210 --> 00:30:10,210 Correct. 450 00:30:10,210 --> 00:30:16,070 So, what's that like to kind of get into the world of NASA and get a job working on plucking 451 00:30:16,070 --> 00:30:18,320 astronauts out of the ocean? 452 00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:24,210 Well, [Laughs] I had not planned to come to work for NASA. 453 00:30:24,210 --> 00:30:30,471 I was going to continue school, Oklahoma State University, working on my Master's, but a 454 00:30:30,471 --> 00:30:34,720 good friend of mine, who had relatives in Houston, came down during spring break of 455 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:37,180 our senior year, and he got hired. 456 00:30:37,180 --> 00:30:41,710 He just showed up on site, and they had tables set up, and he came back and said, "They're 457 00:30:41,710 --> 00:30:42,710 looking for people.” 458 00:30:42,710 --> 00:30:45,250 So that's how I started, how I got involved. 459 00:30:45,250 --> 00:30:49,960 So I didn't have a clue what I was getting into when I started except I knew I would 460 00:30:49,960 --> 00:30:55,820 be working -- associated with landing and recovery for Apollo. 461 00:30:55,820 --> 00:31:02,620 And I don't think I ever -- I don't think I ever worried about the fact that I didn't 462 00:31:02,620 --> 00:31:07,350 know what the hell I'm doing, but I'm learning it as I go along, and there was plenty of 463 00:31:07,350 --> 00:31:08,350 room to do that. 464 00:31:08,350 --> 00:31:11,840 Now, is that how life was at NASA in the '60s? 465 00:31:11,840 --> 00:31:15,300 I mean, that's what I hear is that it's kind of like people got hired and they were like, 466 00:31:15,300 --> 00:31:18,720 "We think we're gonna do this, go figure it out.” 467 00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:20,080 We had free rein, basically. 468 00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:26,711 I mean, that's what I think was so beautiful about that period of time is that I could 469 00:31:26,711 --> 00:31:31,950 go over a number of tests where I was involved in during those days where there was no Test 470 00:31:31,950 --> 00:31:32,950 Review Board. 471 00:31:32,950 --> 00:31:37,880 In some cases, there were no procedures other than we wanted to go do this and try that, 472 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:41,950 and if that didn't work, and it was a piece of hardware or something, take it back to 473 00:31:41,950 --> 00:31:46,550 the shop, go grind on it, bring it back out, put it on the capsule, run a test, and see 474 00:31:46,550 --> 00:31:51,620 if it worked, and then when you're done, you know -- I don't remember -- I don't remember 475 00:31:51,620 --> 00:31:55,610 everything followed up with a drawing, either. 476 00:31:55,610 --> 00:31:58,350 [ Laughs ] So, were you an engineer? 477 00:31:58,350 --> 00:31:59,350 Were you a technician? 478 00:31:59,350 --> 00:32:00,521 Like, how would you have described yourself? 479 00:32:00,521 --> 00:32:08,050 I was a Recovery Engineer -- a degree in Physics and Math, but I was categorized as a Recovery 480 00:32:08,050 --> 00:32:14,780 Engineer, and I worked in a section that was System Suitability Section -- a weird name, 481 00:32:14,780 --> 00:32:23,500 but, basically, our job was to take the hardware that was being built to recover the Apollo 482 00:32:23,500 --> 00:32:27,760 and test its suitability for doing that job. 483 00:32:27,760 --> 00:32:31,360 So it was called the System Suitability Section. 484 00:32:31,360 --> 00:32:39,770 So everything to connect with splashdown and recovery we got involved with some way and 485 00:32:39,770 --> 00:32:47,220 either tested -- Well, we tested in a water tank there at the Johnson Space Center -- Manned 486 00:32:47,220 --> 00:32:50,970 Spacecraft Center back then, and then we were close to the Gulf of Mexico, so we would go 487 00:32:50,970 --> 00:32:51,970 out. 488 00:32:51,970 --> 00:32:57,010 We had our own boat that we used to take the capsules out into the Galveston Bay or out 489 00:32:57,010 --> 00:33:01,500 in the Gulf and do tests. 490 00:33:01,500 --> 00:33:04,820 the '60s? 491 00:33:04,820 --> 00:33:06,050 Is there a typical day? 492 00:33:06,050 --> 00:33:10,150 Is this kind of like a just, hey, we know what the ultimate goal is and just whatever 493 00:33:10,150 --> 00:33:11,590 it takes to get it done? 494 00:33:11,590 --> 00:33:18,430 Yes, the last thing you said, Josh, I think is exactly what that was about. 495 00:33:18,430 --> 00:33:26,550 We had an idea, and we were free to just go grab a handful of technicians, folks who would 496 00:33:26,550 --> 00:33:34,030 be involved in setting up a test, and, a lot of times, just making it up as we went along. 497 00:33:34,030 --> 00:33:38,930 But we had a concept that we wanted to get to, and we weren't exactly clear how we're 498 00:33:38,930 --> 00:33:43,850 gonna do that, but we didn't spend a lot of time thinking about it other than just going 499 00:33:43,850 --> 00:33:47,120 and starting to do it and do it as we went along. 500 00:33:47,120 --> 00:33:53,980 Did you feel a sense of pressure or a sense of -- I guess I ask the question like, was 501 00:33:53,980 --> 00:33:58,410 there pressure that we had to kind of be done by the end of '69? 502 00:33:58,410 --> 00:34:06,890 I don't think that I -- You know, I don't think I ever thought in terms of pressure. 503 00:34:06,890 --> 00:34:12,580 You know, I was learning the trade, basically, and I had a mentor, and so I just basically 504 00:34:12,580 --> 00:34:21,960 would follow him around and learn on how things were being done back in that timeframe. 505 00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:26,850 We didn't spend a lot of time thinking about -- I think spending a lot of time worrying 506 00:34:26,850 --> 00:34:32,020 about the future more than what we had to do today to do what needed to be done that 507 00:34:32,020 --> 00:34:33,929 day or that week and get it done. 508 00:34:33,929 --> 00:34:35,360 That's just what we did. 509 00:34:35,360 --> 00:34:39,690 So, Melissa, certainly not to leave you out of the conversation, but definitely kind of 510 00:34:39,690 --> 00:34:40,970 setting a stage there. 511 00:34:40,970 --> 00:34:41,970 Mm-hmm. 512 00:34:41,970 --> 00:34:44,909 As you've worked with Milt and as you've spent time kind of working on Recovery Operations 513 00:34:44,909 --> 00:34:51,679 for Orion -- or doing testing now, getting ready for the future -- how are the stories 514 00:34:51,679 --> 00:34:55,120 that you hear -- how do you relate to those with our culture today? 515 00:34:55,120 --> 00:34:58,510 That's so funny that you would ask that 'cause, so, first I'd say that having Milt on the 516 00:34:58,510 --> 00:35:01,290 team is really like a breath of fresh air a lot of the time. 517 00:35:01,290 --> 00:35:06,300 He's very encouraging, and the team loves him and to hear his stories and that kind 518 00:35:06,300 --> 00:35:11,750 of stuff, and he will frequently say that this is a magnitude harder than what they 519 00:35:11,750 --> 00:35:16,270 tried to do on Apollo, and we have a lot more people on the team, I think, who have their 520 00:35:16,270 --> 00:35:24,270 fingers in discussions and a lot more paperwork and traceability and the types of things that 521 00:35:24,270 --> 00:35:27,370 I think maybe have the freedom to do differently. 522 00:35:27,370 --> 00:35:32,520 One of the examples, right now, I would say, we're working on a strobe objective. 523 00:35:32,520 --> 00:35:36,290 We're trying to -- There's a strobe that goes on the capsule so that you can see it in event 524 00:35:36,290 --> 00:35:38,880 of an emergency landing, or if you land at night. 525 00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:39,880 Okay. 526 00:35:39,880 --> 00:35:45,220 And I think, Milt, you had a strobe, as well, and we're trying to develop the test plan, 527 00:35:45,220 --> 00:35:49,280 understand all the parameters, and get all the permissions, and, you know, Milt's told 528 00:35:49,280 --> 00:35:54,830 me that they just sit on top of the roof at JSC and make sure they can see the light from 529 00:35:54,830 --> 00:35:56,870 Galveston Bay, and here we are. 530 00:35:56,870 --> 00:35:57,870 [ Laughs ] 531 00:35:57,870 --> 00:36:01,360 We're trying to put all these procedures and plans and timelines and schedules and stuff 532 00:36:01,360 --> 00:36:05,030 together to do a 45-minute test. 533 00:36:05,030 --> 00:36:12,290 So I would say it's definitely different than some of the things that Milt was able to enact 534 00:36:12,290 --> 00:36:15,460 in Apollo with the culture that they had back then. 535 00:36:15,460 --> 00:36:17,460 So -- And this is a question for either of you. 536 00:36:17,460 --> 00:36:19,960 How would I summarize that difference? 537 00:36:19,960 --> 00:36:23,510 Is it a nature of kind of working towards repeatability? 538 00:36:23,510 --> 00:36:24,950 Is it working towards precision? 539 00:36:24,950 --> 00:36:27,970 Like, what's a way to classify that? 540 00:36:27,970 --> 00:36:29,350 Why it's so different? 541 00:36:29,350 --> 00:36:30,350 Yeah. 542 00:36:30,350 --> 00:36:31,350 Like, what's the difference? 543 00:36:31,350 --> 00:36:33,510 Like, if you could summarize it, what's the difference? 544 00:36:33,510 --> 00:36:34,510 I don't – 545 00:36:34,510 --> 00:36:35,950 Oh, Melissa. 546 00:36:35,950 --> 00:36:38,400 That's kind of tough. 547 00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:50,230 I think -- Well, as NASA grew up, right or wrong -- and I hardly judge, but various processes 548 00:36:50,230 --> 00:36:54,350 changed, requirements changed. 549 00:36:54,350 --> 00:36:58,420 We did a lot of things that I would -- I would tell you right now, 'cause I was involved 550 00:36:58,420 --> 00:37:04,520 in some -- we did a number of things that we were not safe when we did them. 551 00:37:04,520 --> 00:37:10,870 I mean, when we were doing some work, we were not really safe, and we were fortunate, very 552 00:37:10,870 --> 00:37:12,950 fortunate a number of times. 553 00:37:12,950 --> 00:37:13,950 Sure. 554 00:37:13,950 --> 00:37:20,360 Well, throughout the period of time from back then to now, we've all been through tragedies 555 00:37:20,360 --> 00:37:21,810 in this program. 556 00:37:21,810 --> 00:37:22,900 Agreed. 557 00:37:22,900 --> 00:37:37,840 And so along the way, new requirements come into play, and there's a greater attempt to 558 00:37:37,840 --> 00:37:44,750 do things smartly and safely at the same time, and that sometimes is a real hard thing to 559 00:37:44,750 --> 00:37:45,750 do. 560 00:37:45,750 --> 00:37:51,390 But I do think that it's all in a positive effort to have proper traceability, proper 561 00:37:51,390 --> 00:37:58,290 accountability, proper visibility to those who are accepting risk for the certain tests 562 00:37:58,290 --> 00:38:02,790 that we're doing or the certain flights that we're doing, and so I think that it's all 563 00:38:02,790 --> 00:38:05,120 with the right idea. 564 00:38:05,120 --> 00:38:09,900 I don't believe when Apollo started, you guys had a Safety and Mission Assurance organization, 565 00:38:09,900 --> 00:38:15,910 and I think we've grown into that culture as we've had some lessons learned and some 566 00:38:15,910 --> 00:38:16,910 tragedies. 567 00:38:16,910 --> 00:38:17,910 Sure. 568 00:38:17,910 --> 00:38:22,180 So I think it's an effort to kind of bring it all back together and make sure that everyone 569 00:38:22,180 --> 00:38:26,380 is comfortable with what we're doing based on some lessons learned we've had. 570 00:38:26,380 --> 00:38:31,640 But I do think that sometimes you can get wrapped up in too many boards to make a simple 571 00:38:31,640 --> 00:38:32,640 decision. 572 00:38:32,640 --> 00:38:39,010 So there's probably a balance there that we could probably strike a little bit better 573 00:38:39,010 --> 00:38:42,670 with some work and analysis on our processes. 574 00:38:42,670 --> 00:38:48,740 The overhead that I've seen that Melissa talks about, they get through pretty doggone good. 575 00:38:48,740 --> 00:38:56,230 I mean, it's there, and with her leadership and others, I mean, they get through these 576 00:38:56,230 --> 00:39:05,220 things, and sometimes it's difficult to hear all that going on, but it's not like it -- I 577 00:39:05,220 --> 00:39:11,860 don't want to say it slows down what you're really trying to do, but it is a very delicate 578 00:39:11,860 --> 00:39:16,850 balance between that, and that's what I've seen Melissa and other leaders in the Land 579 00:39:16,850 --> 00:39:22,270 and Recovery -- I mean, I can sense that that's what they're exactly trying to do is do what 580 00:39:22,270 --> 00:39:27,210 really needs to be done and recognizing what's involved. 581 00:39:27,210 --> 00:39:31,760 So, Milt, you talk about kind of the safety differences. 582 00:39:31,760 --> 00:39:37,450 So back in the '60s, was it a situation where, like, you recognize, "Hey, this is not the 583 00:39:37,450 --> 00:39:40,130 safest way to do this, but we have to go. 584 00:39:40,130 --> 00:39:41,290 We've got to move"? 585 00:39:41,290 --> 00:39:42,290 Is that how this is? 586 00:39:42,290 --> 00:39:43,990 Or is it more in hindsight you're saying like, "Wow. 587 00:39:43,990 --> 00:39:47,110 Like, we got away with some crazy stuff that we didn't realize at the time"? 588 00:39:47,110 --> 00:39:50,580 Well, probably a little bit of all of what you said. 589 00:39:50,580 --> 00:39:55,370 You know, I can think of some things that I was involved in relative to testing, and 590 00:39:55,370 --> 00:40:03,580 it's like we got what we needed to get done, and in retrospect, not so much then, but years 591 00:40:03,580 --> 00:40:08,100 later, when you think about that, you're thinking, "Well, that was -- You know, we were lucky 592 00:40:08,100 --> 00:40:17,641 that we didn't really injure somebody when we were doing that," and that's just the way 593 00:40:17,641 --> 00:40:20,750 it was. 594 00:40:20,750 --> 00:40:25,850 As we kind of think about this idea of safety, and we kind of mention the idea of crew losses, 595 00:40:25,850 --> 00:40:30,470 back in the '60s, obviously there was this race against Russia. 596 00:40:30,470 --> 00:40:34,330 We lost the Apollo 1 crew very tragically. 597 00:40:34,330 --> 00:40:40,090 How did that really impact the progress and the process for you guys? 598 00:40:40,090 --> 00:40:43,790 And then kind of, Melissa, as a follow-up for you, how are you learning from kind of 599 00:40:43,790 --> 00:40:47,190 that perspective from the Apollo generation? 600 00:40:47,190 --> 00:40:59,369 Well, so going back to Apollo 1 and the fire, it is remarkable what we did in this nation 601 00:40:59,369 --> 00:41:01,090 after that. 602 00:41:01,090 --> 00:41:06,960 I mean, you talk about gutsy work going on. 603 00:41:06,960 --> 00:41:08,320 Yeah. 604 00:41:08,320 --> 00:41:16,490 We -- Apollo 7 first manned flight, and then the gutsiest thing this nation has ever done 605 00:41:16,490 --> 00:41:22,150 in manned spaceflight in my opinion is Apollo 8, the second Apollo mission where we put 606 00:41:22,150 --> 00:41:27,190 that capsule on top of the big Saturn V, and we went to the Moon -- didn't land on the 607 00:41:27,190 --> 00:41:28,500 Moon, but we went to the Moon. 608 00:41:28,500 --> 00:41:33,680 After one manned test flight of Apollo, we did that... 609 00:41:33,680 --> 00:41:34,680 Yeah. 610 00:41:34,680 --> 00:41:44,230 ...and that, I think, is what really -- really allowed us to say, you know, once Apollo 8 611 00:41:44,230 --> 00:41:46,211 was done, it was like we're rocking and rolling here. 612 00:41:46,211 --> 00:41:47,301 We know what we need to do. 613 00:41:47,301 --> 00:41:53,500 We set up the management structure back then, set up the right kind of things that had to 614 00:41:53,500 --> 00:42:01,010 be done on Apollo 9, Apollo 10, leading up to Apollo 11 -- stepping stones that all worked, 615 00:42:01,010 --> 00:42:06,780 and, Josh, I might have got off the subject of your question, so I'm... 616 00:42:06,780 --> 00:42:07,820 No, that's all right. 617 00:42:07,820 --> 00:42:11,850 No, it's good stuff, 'cause, again, I think it's coming back to that reality of, hey, 618 00:42:11,850 --> 00:42:19,180 how do we, like, honor, sacrifice, and make good decisions for the future, and so, Melissa, 619 00:42:19,180 --> 00:42:22,590 again, over to you kind of asking the question like, how does the team kind of process the 620 00:42:22,590 --> 00:42:26,600 fact that you're gonna go pull astronauts out of the ocean after what is, hopefully, 621 00:42:26,600 --> 00:42:27,960 a very successful flight? 622 00:42:27,960 --> 00:42:33,080 Yes, I would say that I think part of your question was how have we changed maybe from 623 00:42:33,080 --> 00:42:36,869 Apollo and how we learned from the loss that we've had, and I think that we've learned 624 00:42:36,869 --> 00:42:41,630 a lot from lessons Apollo and the Space Shuttle Program brought us about incremental testing 625 00:42:41,630 --> 00:42:48,250 and risk acceptance and redundancy and tolerance and margins and factors of safety and design 626 00:42:48,250 --> 00:42:56,730 standards and what we feel is acceptable for putting humans -- human people in a giant 627 00:42:56,730 --> 00:43:01,810 rocket that has, you know, explosives and cryogenics and different things in it, right, 628 00:43:01,810 --> 00:43:07,770 so that we can get to space, and so I think, you know, we have learned from every single 629 00:43:07,770 --> 00:43:11,440 -- not just tragedy, but all of the successes that we've had. 630 00:43:11,440 --> 00:43:16,980 We learn from successes that other people, like ULA and SpaceX and Boeing have had. 631 00:43:16,980 --> 00:43:22,910 Any success in the space industry is success for all of us, and we learn things from that. 632 00:43:22,910 --> 00:43:25,500 We are excited. 633 00:43:25,500 --> 00:43:31,460 We did go from Apollo to water landings to Space Shuttle land landings, and now we're 634 00:43:31,460 --> 00:43:36,210 back into the water landings, and I would say that Milt is the only one on the team 635 00:43:36,210 --> 00:43:40,280 that really has any experience with that, because those of us who have human spaceflight 636 00:43:40,280 --> 00:43:44,160 experience are from the International Space Station Program or from Shuttle. 637 00:43:44,160 --> 00:43:45,160 Right. 638 00:43:45,160 --> 00:43:49,090 So that's one of the reasons why he's so valuable on the team, and he helps us with a lot of 639 00:43:49,090 --> 00:43:53,340 the things that Apollo did in their flight rules and their weather conditions and where 640 00:43:53,340 --> 00:43:58,710 did they have issues, and so we're all very excited about what we're doing, but we're 641 00:43:58,710 --> 00:44:04,900 trying to be very meticulous with our testing, with our procedures, with our safety culture. 642 00:44:04,900 --> 00:44:08,900 We work with the Navy again just like they worked with the Navy a little bit in a different 643 00:44:08,900 --> 00:44:14,700 ship configuration, but there are some similarities to the way that Apollo did recovery to what 644 00:44:14,700 --> 00:44:17,510 we're trying to do now. 645 00:44:17,510 --> 00:44:22,670 Milt, were you there when Apollo 11 came back and did you help get the "Eagle" out of the 646 00:44:22,670 --> 00:44:23,670 water? 647 00:44:23,670 --> 00:44:27,260 I guess it wasn't the "Eagle," 'cause the "Eagle" is on the Moon. 648 00:44:27,260 --> 00:44:28,260 That's right. 649 00:44:28,260 --> 00:44:29,500 The "Columbia" was the Command Module -- 650 00:44:29,500 --> 00:44:30,500 Thank you. 651 00:44:30,500 --> 00:44:31,500 ...yeah, for Apollo 11. 652 00:44:31,500 --> 00:44:35,110 Well, I had many different jobs back in the Apollo days. 653 00:44:35,110 --> 00:44:40,490 Apollo 11, I met the "Hornet," "USS Hornet" at Pearl Harbor. 654 00:44:40,490 --> 00:44:47,440 When the ship got back to Pearl Harbor, I was one of two NASA engineers that oversaw 655 00:44:47,440 --> 00:44:54,330 the contractor team that safed the Command Module for air transport back to the United 656 00:44:54,330 --> 00:44:57,620 States -- back to the continental United States. 657 00:44:57,620 --> 00:44:59,590 So, for Apollo 11, that's what I did. 658 00:44:59,590 --> 00:45:02,670 I was one of the two team leaders. 659 00:45:02,670 --> 00:45:09,730 We did over about a 48-hour period nonstop, had the contractor team safe the Command Module, 660 00:45:09,730 --> 00:45:18,470 and then load it up into a four-engine turboprop cargo carrier. 661 00:45:18,470 --> 00:45:24,670 This is back during the Vietnam time, so this is about the only aircraft that we could use 662 00:45:24,670 --> 00:45:28,100 that could make the jump from Hawaii over to the West Coast. 663 00:45:28,100 --> 00:45:34,860 That aircraft, I guarantee you, Josh, I'm surprised the rivets stayed in that airplane 664 00:45:34,860 --> 00:45:37,710 when we flew that thing back over here. 665 00:45:37,710 --> 00:45:38,710 [ Laughs ] 666 00:45:38,710 --> 00:45:40,640 That thing shaked, rattled, and rolled the entire time. 667 00:45:40,640 --> 00:45:48,320 So I was the NASA guy on board the airplane that went all the way back to Houston with 668 00:45:48,320 --> 00:45:53,980 the Command Module to attach it to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory for further processing 669 00:45:53,980 --> 00:45:54,980 when we were done. 670 00:45:54,980 --> 00:45:58,290 So, did you get to see Neil, Buzz, and Michael when they came back? 671 00:45:58,290 --> 00:46:04,470 I saw them being taken off of the ship in a mobile quarantine facility that they had. 672 00:46:04,470 --> 00:46:05,470 Sure. 673 00:46:05,470 --> 00:46:12,190 I saw that happening, but just from down on the deck or down on the dock, seeing them 674 00:46:12,190 --> 00:46:14,750 being picked up inside that trailer. 675 00:46:14,750 --> 00:46:15,820 Cool. 676 00:46:15,820 --> 00:46:16,820 That's awesome. 677 00:46:16,820 --> 00:46:20,770 So, Melissa, what's the plan for you as far as with Orion, where are you expecting to 678 00:46:20,770 --> 00:46:24,220 be located for Orion Recovery? 679 00:46:24,220 --> 00:46:30,460 So we'll be on a ship, a landing-platform docked ship off the coast of San Diego. 680 00:46:30,460 --> 00:46:34,920 The primary landing location's about 38 to 50 nautical miles off the coast. 681 00:46:34,920 --> 00:46:40,730 I, specifically, will be in the landing area. 682 00:46:40,730 --> 00:46:43,630 They call it the C.I.C. 683 00:46:43,630 --> 00:46:44,760 Combat... 684 00:46:44,760 --> 00:46:45,900 Gosh. 685 00:46:45,900 --> 00:46:47,440 Combat Information Center, I think. 686 00:46:47,440 --> 00:46:49,020 Combat Information Center on the ship. 687 00:46:49,020 --> 00:46:53,740 It's where they run ops on the ship when they have different operations that they run. 688 00:46:53,740 --> 00:46:59,450 So that's where I will be, along with Public Affairs and a few other folks, and we'll have 689 00:46:59,450 --> 00:47:02,700 access to the bridge where the captain's at, and we'll have access to the folks who are 690 00:47:02,700 --> 00:47:05,530 doing the actual operation in the open water. 691 00:47:05,530 --> 00:47:10,510 So we'll be physically located on the ship when we do the Recovery. 692 00:47:10,510 --> 00:47:14,220 So you thought about what it will be like to greet astronauts coming back from the Moon 693 00:47:14,220 --> 00:47:15,220 someday? 694 00:47:15,220 --> 00:47:16,220 [ Chuckles ] 695 00:47:16,220 --> 00:47:19,520 Yes, actually, it's quite mind-blowing to think about to be perfectly honest, and, you 696 00:47:19,520 --> 00:47:21,470 know, what do you say to them? 697 00:47:21,470 --> 00:47:22,830 Is it, "Welcome home"? 698 00:47:22,830 --> 00:47:27,270 [ Laughter ] You know, just something like that, knowing that we are there to get them 699 00:47:27,270 --> 00:47:30,911 out as quickly as possible and get them to medical so that they, you know, can start 700 00:47:30,911 --> 00:47:32,730 to recover from being deconditioned. 701 00:47:32,730 --> 00:47:34,960 But, yes, it's historical. 702 00:47:34,960 --> 00:47:39,210 It's a really exciting thing for me to think about. 703 00:47:39,210 --> 00:47:48,140 And, Milt, kind of as you've worked with the team in your current role, what's the one 704 00:47:48,140 --> 00:47:52,340 message that you want to leave to the whole team to kind of help to -- whether it be encourage 705 00:47:52,340 --> 00:47:59,620 or inspire or support them five decades later from Apollo 11 and the '60s where we landed 706 00:47:59,620 --> 00:48:00,620 on the Moon? 707 00:48:00,620 --> 00:48:03,980 Well, first of all, Melissa made a comment a while ago. 708 00:48:03,980 --> 00:48:11,210 The thought came up, and that is, many times as I am participating -- basically, I'm tied 709 00:48:11,210 --> 00:48:21,470 into conferences from my home, and occasionally we have face-to-face, but many times she doesn't 710 00:48:21,470 --> 00:48:27,960 hear from me, and she doesn't hear from me because I don't have anything to offer at 711 00:48:27,960 --> 00:48:31,920 that time because what they're doing makes sense to me. 712 00:48:31,920 --> 00:48:34,950 I mean, I mentioned it a while ago. 713 00:48:34,950 --> 00:48:39,760 This recovery of this spacecraft out of the water is an order of magnitude, if not two 714 00:48:39,760 --> 00:48:45,500 orders of magnitude more difficult than what we did back in Apollo, and it's very simple. 715 00:48:45,500 --> 00:48:51,280 Because a program sometime ago decided they don't want to take mass into orbit that is 716 00:48:51,280 --> 00:48:54,830 gonna be used at the end of the mission only to pick this thing up. 717 00:48:54,830 --> 00:48:58,650 We had a lifting loop on board the Apollo. 718 00:48:58,650 --> 00:49:02,720 This spacecraft is probably 8,000, 10,000 pounds heavier on the water, and it's about 719 00:49:02,720 --> 00:49:04,080 4 feet diameter, also. 720 00:49:04,080 --> 00:49:05,730 It's bigger, and it's like a cork. 721 00:49:05,730 --> 00:49:07,490 It sits on top of the water. 722 00:49:07,490 --> 00:49:12,109 And so they had no way to just get big ol' -- We used bit ol' honking aircraft carriers 723 00:49:12,109 --> 00:49:13,780 back in those days. 724 00:49:13,780 --> 00:49:14,910 Right. 725 00:49:14,910 --> 00:49:23,500 And with a crane on board the ship, even though we augmented that crane, and it was an extremely 726 00:49:23,500 --> 00:49:24,710 simple operation. 727 00:49:24,710 --> 00:49:35,020 So it's remarkable how they have -- I've watched this develop where you drag in the Orion capsule 728 00:49:35,020 --> 00:49:42,350 mock-up into the well deck ship, and, I mean, it has turned out to be a very elegant way 729 00:49:42,350 --> 00:49:51,930 to -- It looks weird, but it's a very elegant way to take advantage of physics and be sure 730 00:49:51,930 --> 00:49:57,890 that you're tending this 20-some-thousand-pound vehicle as you bring it into the well deck. 731 00:49:57,890 --> 00:50:01,980 I probably got straight off on something there, but that's -- [ Laughs ] 732 00:50:01,980 --> 00:50:04,040 No, I think it's great. 733 00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:10,470 I think that -- What I hear from you is that whether it's good or bad, the long processes 734 00:50:10,470 --> 00:50:12,790 are paying off, that we're doing things really well. 735 00:50:12,790 --> 00:50:19,300 Well, so, yeah, and I got away from part of your question there. 736 00:50:19,300 --> 00:50:26,830 The concern that I have - and Melissa knows this, I think, and some of the other key leadership 737 00:50:26,830 --> 00:50:29,060 of the team. 738 00:50:29,060 --> 00:50:37,800 They've got a big team, and there's a tendency that everyone wants to play on a big team... 739 00:50:37,800 --> 00:50:38,800 Sure. 740 00:50:38,800 --> 00:50:41,440 And not everybody needs to play on a big team. 741 00:50:41,440 --> 00:50:43,990 Our team was much smaller. 742 00:50:43,990 --> 00:50:47,370 The communications during recovery -- I've often told her. 743 00:50:47,370 --> 00:50:54,359 I said I can recall almost every mission I was on. 744 00:50:54,359 --> 00:50:59,840 We told the captain of the ship that the spacecraft was safe on the water, and then he gave the 745 00:50:59,840 --> 00:51:04,360 command for them dropping swimmers in the water from a helicopter and starting the process, 746 00:51:04,360 --> 00:51:13,619 and the NASA team leaders back then probably didn't say hardly anything during that entire 747 00:51:13,619 --> 00:51:18,760 hour, hour-and-a-half process to get both the crew and the Command Module back on the 748 00:51:18,760 --> 00:51:19,760 ship. 749 00:51:19,760 --> 00:51:21,620 I mean, there was no go, no-go's. 750 00:51:21,620 --> 00:51:27,890 The helicopter, the swimmers, the deck force all knew what to do, when to do it, and how 751 00:51:27,890 --> 00:51:35,030 to do it, and there was no reason to quiz them about anything, and we were fortunate. 752 00:51:35,030 --> 00:51:40,040 In picking this Apollo up, we never had any serious problems. 753 00:51:40,040 --> 00:51:42,119 Well, I should not have said. 754 00:51:42,119 --> 00:51:50,900 Apollo 9, we had a wench problem, and we had to use what was called a Tilly. 755 00:51:50,900 --> 00:51:55,470 It's a big, old crane on board an aircraft carrier that's used to pick up a downed aircraft 756 00:51:55,470 --> 00:52:00,070 in the water -- pick it up, and it's on the flight deck. 757 00:52:00,070 --> 00:52:05,700 So we had to use that crane to get the Apollo 9 Command Module back on board, and that was 758 00:52:05,700 --> 00:52:10,040 pretty tricky because there's not a good way to tend that thing as it's coming all the 759 00:52:10,040 --> 00:52:13,330 way up 40-, 50-some feet. 760 00:52:13,330 --> 00:52:14,390 Awesome. 761 00:52:14,390 --> 00:52:16,410 Melissa, any final thoughts? 762 00:52:16,410 --> 00:52:19,160 No, I just -- not really. 763 00:52:19,160 --> 00:52:25,450 We're excited about the direction that the agency's moving in with the Moon to Mars Program. 764 00:52:25,450 --> 00:52:27,540 Recovery is ready. 765 00:52:27,540 --> 00:52:29,700 We have our hardware. 766 00:52:29,700 --> 00:52:34,140 We actually are getting ready to move into what we call Operation. 767 00:52:34,140 --> 00:52:38,880 So we've got hardware that's been verified and validated and meets all of our requirements 768 00:52:38,880 --> 00:52:41,550 for how we move the capsule around. 769 00:52:41,550 --> 00:52:45,980 It's making sure that we preserve it so that we can get the data that we need off of it 770 00:52:45,980 --> 00:52:51,180 to verify that we can fly crew for the first crewed mission, and so I'm very proud of the 771 00:52:55,050 --> 00:52:52,180 team. 772 00:52:55,050 --> 00:53:00,600 In fact, I think some of it will shrink a little bit now that we're getting our hardware 773 00:53:00,600 --> 00:53:06,359 requirements bought off, but we're excited and we're ready. 774 00:53:06,359 --> 00:53:07,359 Awesome. 775 00:53:07,359 --> 00:53:11,120 Well, Milt, we're super proud of you and the accomplishments – 776 00:53:11,120 --> 00:53:13,480 Can I tell you one story if you don't mind? 777 00:53:13,480 --> 00:53:14,480 Yeah. 778 00:53:16,480 --> 00:53:15,480 I love the stories. 779 00:53:16,480 --> 00:53:17,480 Milt, fire away, man. 780 00:53:17,480 --> 00:53:18,480 I'm excited. 781 00:53:18,480 --> 00:53:19,480 Here it comes. 782 00:53:19,480 --> 00:53:20,480 I thought about it. 783 00:53:20,480 --> 00:53:24,010 So back -- I talked about Apollo 8. 784 00:53:24,010 --> 00:53:28,640 I need to tell you how part of that happened. 785 00:53:28,640 --> 00:53:31,109 So, setting the scene here. 786 00:53:31,109 --> 00:53:32,980 This is the Christmas Eve trip around the Moon. 787 00:53:32,980 --> 00:53:34,480 Christmas Eve, 1968. 788 00:53:34,480 --> 00:53:35,480 Right. 789 00:53:35,480 --> 00:53:37,660 It is at the height of the Vietnam War. 790 00:53:37,660 --> 00:53:38,660 Okay. 791 00:53:38,660 --> 00:53:46,570 Forces are all over out there across the Pacific, and so assets -- ships, planes -- you know, 792 00:53:46,570 --> 00:53:51,560 they're just not -- I mean, they're around, but it's not like -- It took some effort to 793 00:53:51,560 --> 00:53:52,570 pull that together. 794 00:53:52,570 --> 00:54:01,190 Well, the very first flight director, Chris Kraft, was the lead flight director back in 795 00:54:01,190 --> 00:54:10,780 those days, and NASA Headquarters wanted him to go out to Pearl Harbor and meet with Admiral 796 00:54:10,780 --> 00:54:14,210 John McCain from that family. 797 00:54:14,210 --> 00:54:21,040 So he was the Commander in Chief of the Pacific at that time, and he was to go out there -- Kraft 798 00:54:21,040 --> 00:54:31,020 was to go out there and brief him and his team about what's needed for Apollo 8, and 799 00:54:31,020 --> 00:54:39,340 so Chris Kraft went out there and gave the briefing, and this is an example of how -- This 800 00:54:39,340 --> 00:54:45,520 is something that happened back then that I'm not sure happens today collectively in 801 00:54:45,520 --> 00:54:48,869 our country to do some great things. 802 00:54:48,869 --> 00:54:53,880 What happened back then was when Kraft got through giving a briefing to an audience of 803 00:54:53,880 --> 00:55:03,500 admirals and generals out there at Pearl Harbor, Admiral McCain looked at Kraft and looked 804 00:55:03,500 --> 00:55:08,430 at the audience, and he said, "Great briefing. 805 00:55:08,430 --> 00:55:12,210 Give this man what he wants.” 806 00:55:12,210 --> 00:55:18,910 And I don't see a lot of that today where we're trying to do great things, and that's 807 00:55:18,910 --> 00:55:22,200 the big difference to me. 808 00:55:22,200 --> 00:55:26,820 Is it just this kind of authority to say like, "This is the right thing"... 809 00:55:26,820 --> 00:55:27,820 You betcha. 810 00:55:27,820 --> 00:55:28,820 ..."whatever it takes, go do it.” 811 00:55:28,820 --> 00:55:29,820 You betcha. 812 00:55:29,820 --> 00:55:35,740 I mean, that was a good example of it -- "Give this man what he wants" -- back in that timeframe. 813 00:55:35,740 --> 00:55:37,080 Awesome. 814 00:55:37,080 --> 00:55:40,220 And I was on the "Yorktown," which was the Apollo 8 recovery. 815 00:55:40,220 --> 00:55:46,180 That was my first time to be on a splashdown of Apollo -- Apollo 8. 816 00:55:46,180 --> 00:55:47,220 What's that feeling like? 817 00:55:47,220 --> 00:55:52,030 You got guys that literally just saw the Moon from up close -- the first guys ever, right? 818 00:55:52,030 --> 00:55:53,030 [ Chuckling ] Yes. 819 00:55:53,030 --> 00:55:54,030 Yes. 820 00:55:54,030 --> 00:55:55,030 Absolutely. 821 00:55:55,030 --> 00:55:56,030 They come back, and you're getting to pull them out of the water. 822 00:55:56,030 --> 00:55:57,030 Yes. 823 00:55:57,030 --> 00:55:58,160 What's that feel like? 824 00:55:58,160 --> 00:55:59,349 Well... 825 00:55:59,349 --> 00:56:03,079 [ Laughs ] When they're safely on board the ship, it really feels good. 826 00:56:03,079 --> 00:56:06,080 [ Laughter ] It really feels good. 827 00:56:06,080 --> 00:56:08,359 And I think Borman was on that crew, if I recall. 828 00:56:08,359 --> 00:56:10,860 I hope that's right. 829 00:56:10,860 --> 00:56:15,960 So once the crew is on board -- Actually, the crew got picked up by helicopter. 830 00:56:15,960 --> 00:56:17,940 That's how we did it back in those days. 831 00:56:17,940 --> 00:56:19,740 Then we got the Command Module on board. 832 00:56:19,740 --> 00:56:24,109 It was several hours after the crew had been on board, I'm down there at the Command Module 833 00:56:24,109 --> 00:56:28,640 with the team, and we're safing it and going through and de-stowing stuff and packaging 834 00:56:28,640 --> 00:56:29,760 things up, or whatever. 835 00:56:29,760 --> 00:56:35,160 The next thing I know is there's two hands on my shoulder, shaking me, and it was Frank 836 00:56:35,160 --> 00:56:38,740 Borman just saying, "Looks good, buddy. 837 00:56:38,740 --> 00:56:39,740 How we doing?” 838 00:56:39,740 --> 00:56:40,740 You know? 839 00:56:40,740 --> 00:56:41,740 And that was cool. 840 00:56:41,740 --> 00:56:42,740 Oh, man. 841 00:56:42,740 --> 00:56:44,140 That's got to feel special. 842 00:56:44,140 --> 00:56:45,140 You bet. 843 00:56:47,140 --> 00:56:46,140 Absolutely. 844 00:56:47,140 --> 00:56:50,480 Well, Milt, we're appreciative of your efforts in the '60s to help us be successful, and 845 00:56:50,480 --> 00:56:54,270 even today, helping us prepare to be successful once again on our Moon missions. 846 00:56:54,270 --> 00:56:57,661 Melissa, obviously you guys have a big, big task ahead of you. 847 00:56:57,661 --> 00:56:59,350 I know that you are all up to the challenge... 848 00:56:59,350 --> 00:57:00,350 We are. 849 00:57:00,350 --> 00:57:01,780 ...and we're excited for everything that is to come. 850 00:57:01,780 --> 00:57:03,180 So thank you all, both, for being here. 851 00:57:03,180 --> 00:57:08,030 This team can recover this spacecraft, I guarantee you, and they're gonna be able to recover 852 00:57:08,030 --> 00:57:09,190 the crew, too. 853 00:57:09,190 --> 00:57:10,190 Thank you. 854 00:57:10,190 --> 00:57:11,340 Thank you, Milt. 855 00:57:11,340 --> 00:57:13,070 Thanks for having us. 856 00:57:13,070 --> 00:57:14,340 You heard it here first. 857 00:57:14,340 --> 00:57:15,840 The team is ready. 858 00:57:15,840 --> 00:57:19,460 They're pumped and getting excited for the Moon missions coming up in the next few years. 859 00:57:19,460 --> 00:57:22,740 I'm Joshua Santora, and that's our show. 860 00:57:22,740 --> 00:57:24,560 Thanks for stopping by the "Rocket Ranch.” 861 00:57:24,560 --> 00:57:29,210 And special thanks to our guests, Bob Sieck, Melissa Jones, and Milt Heflin. 862 00:57:29,210 --> 00:57:34,040 To learn more about the Apollo 50th Anniversary activities, visit nasa.gov. 863 00:57:34,040 --> 00:57:39,260 For more on Orion Underway Recovery, visit nasa.gov/egs. 864 00:57:39,260 --> 00:57:43,830 For all things Orion, visit nasa.gov/orion. 865 00:57:43,830 --> 00:57:50,070 And to learn more about everything going on at the Kennedy Space Center, go to nasa.gov/kennedy. 866 00:57:50,070 --> 00:57:54,480 Special shout-out to our producer, John Sackman, our soundmen, Lorne Mathre and Michelle Stone, 867 00:57:54,480 --> 00:57:58,810 editor, Michelle Stone, and special thanks to Amanda Griffin.